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allowing preference differences between skilled and unskilled workers.3 Section 3 shows that
the introduction of this assumption may affect the results of the interplay of agglomeration and
dispersion forces in determining the equilibrium outcomes, and Section 4 more deeply discusses the
preference and competition effects on prices determined by changes in the localization of workers
and firms, underlining that the heterogeneity in preferences we introduce may be responsible for
the emergence of stable asymmetric equilibria. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The model with heterogeneous preferences
We consider a model with two regions, indexed with r and s, endowed with two factors/workers,
which are distinguished between skilled interregionally mobile workers, indexed with H, and un-
skilled interregionally immobile workers, indexed with L. The total number of skilled workers is
H, while each region is endowed with L/2 unskilled workers. Workers consume M varieties of a
modern manufactured good, with each variety denoted by suffix i and consumed in the quantity
qi, and the quantity q0 of a traditional good (the numeraire of the model). Moreover, workers’
preferences are represented by the following quadratic utility function:
U(q0; qi, i ∈ [0,M ]) = αj
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with j = H,L, αj > 0 and βj > δj > 0.
The total number (mass) of produced varieties M , is the sum of the nr varieties produced in
region r and the ns varieties produced in region s. Parameters αj , βj and δj describe workers’
preferences. Particularly, parameter αj expresses the intensity of the preference for the differenti-
ated good with respect to the traditional good, and the two parameters βj and δj , with βj > δj ,
express the intensity of the preference of consumers of type j for differentiation in the consump-
tion of the modern good. Hence, for any given value of βj , parameter δj underlines the degree of
3 We choose to work with this model because of its tractability. Moreover, we notice that Tabuchi and Thisse
(2001) also adopt this structure.
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substitutability between varieties and the higher δj is, the higher the degree of substitutability of
varieties is.
It is straightforward to notice that the setup we consider only differs from that originally
proposed by Ottaviano et al. (2002) in the fact that we introduce the suffix j that characterizes
parameters in (1). This suffix draws attention to the fact that skilled and unskilled workers
have different preferences. In the rest of the paper we show this simple extension of the original
framework may give rise to some interesting results, given that prices will show a new kind of
dependence on the spatial distribution of workers and firms, and given that this will allow us to
identify a new force related to the demand side that can be at work in determining the regional
distribution of the economic activity.
Each worker maximizes (1) given its budget constraint
MZ
0
piqidi+ q0 = wj + q¯0 (2)
where wj represents the wage of the worker of type j and q¯0 is the endowment of the numeraire
of each individual.4
The demand function for each variety produced in region z of any worker j located in region
v is
qjzv(pzv) = aj − (bj + djM)pzv + djPv (3)
where v, z = r, s. The first element in the suffix of quantities and prices expresses the location of
producers, while the second, the location of the worker who demands the good. Moreover, the new
parameters are obtained in the following way: aj = αj/[(βj +(M − 1)δj ], bj = 1/[βj +(M − 1)δj ]
and dj = δj/(βj − δj)[βj + (M − 1)δj ].5 Finally, Pz is the price indexes prevailing in region z,
which, given the symmetry of all firms in a particular region, is
Pz = nzpzz + nvpvz (4)
4 As usual, the individual endowment of the numeraire is supposed to be sufficiently large to have a positive
consumption of the traditional good in equilibrium for each individual.
5 See, for instance, Ottaviano et al. (2002) and Fujita and Thisse (2002).
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In order to simplify the notation, we drop the suffix L in the three parameters, αL, βL and
δL, which refer to unskilled workers and we assume that parameters referred to skilled workers H
are proportional to those of unskilled workers, with the factor of proportionality given by ρ > 0.
Therefore, we have that
αH = αL/ρ = α/ρ (5)
βH = βL/ρ = β/ρ
δH = δL/ρ = δ/ρ
Moreover, from (5) and the definitions of aj , bj and dj , it is easily verified that
aH = aL = a; bH = ρbL and dH = ρdL (6)
These simple assumptions allow us to introduce a particular kind of workers’ preference het-
erogeneity, sufficiently simple to handle because it requires that parameters referring to skilled
workers are proportional to those of unskilled workers. It would certainly be more general to con-
sider the case in which these parameters were different, without necessarily being proportional.
However, as it will later appear, this simplification alone is sufficient to complicate the analysis
enough to suggest to avoid making matters worse with a more general framework with different
and not necessarily proportional parameters. Hence, we choose to adopt the simplification in (5),
since we already obtain some interesting results with it, and given that it can be considered as a
particular case of a more general one, in which the results of the former would continue to hold
under particular conditions.6
In Fig. 1 we plot the inverse demand function for a variety produced in region z of the j − th
worker located in region v, that is
pzv =
a− qjzv(pzv)
ρ(b+ dM)
+
dPv
(b+ dM)
(7)
6 The nature of our results would be the same when parameters for skilled workers are all lower (higher) than
those for unskilled workers. However, for any other case different from ours it would be possible to compute
equilibrium results, even though for their interpretation we should use simulations.
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with v, z = r, s.7 In particular, Fig. 1 contains the graphics of two inverse demand functions
which are drawn for two different values of ρ, that is ρ1 < ρ2. We note that the two curves
intersect in I when qzv = a. Moreover, as the graphics show, any increase in the preference for the
manufactured good and variety in its consumption, which reduces ρ, produces a clockwise rotation
of the demand curve around I. In particular, we observe that when the preference parameter ρ
goes to zero because of a very strong preference for differentiation that tends to annihilate any
substitutability between varieties, then
lim
ρ→0
qjzv(pzv) = a (8)
Insert figure 1 about here
As we have already stated, in many of our comments, we refer to the case in which ρ < 1, which
corresponds to the case in which skilled workers have a stronger preference for the modern good and
variety in its consumption. These assumptions imply that skilled workers’ elasticity of demand is
smaller than that of unskilled workers. To justify the assumptions that skilled workers’ preference
for the modern good is stronger than that of unskilled workers, we may consider that skilled
workers’ incomes are usually higher than those of unskilled workers. Therefore, by assuming ρ < 1
we may in some sense reflect Joan Robinson’s (1969) thought that increases in agents’ incomes
make individuals demand less elastic. Moreover, we may justify the fact that skilled workers have a
stronger preference for variety in the consumption of the modern good, by observing, for instance,
that skilled workers are the ones who produce the differentiated modern goods and, therefore,
they are more able to appreciate this differentiation.
Let us define with λr the fraction of skilled workers in region r. We notice that each represen-
tative firm which produces in region r sells on the local market the quantity
qrr(prr) = qLrr(prr)
L
2
+ qHrr(prr)λrH (9)
7 It is clear that given our assumption, the demand function of unskilled workers corresponds to the case in
which ρ = 1.
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The quantity sold on the foreign market is instead
qrs(prs) = qLrs(prs)
L
2
+ qHrs(prs)(1− λr)H (10)
Similar expressions can be obtained for firms that produce in region s.
Operating profits of a representative firm which produces in r are obtained by adding oper-
ating profits which derive from sales in r, πrr, to those derived from sales in s, πrs, which are,
respectively,
πrr = prrqrr and πrs = (prs − t) qrs (11)
The production cost of each firm in region z = r, s is generated by the fixed cost that firms have
to sustain in order to employ f skilled workers and are given by
TCr = fwr (12)
Therefore, pure profits πr of the representative firm which produces in region r are
πr = πrr + πrs − fwr (13)
Finally, the assumption of full employment of workers implies that
Hr = λrH = nrf and Hs = (1− λr)H = nsf (14)
3 Preference differences and equilibrium outcomes
In this section we derive equilibrium prices and quantities and skilled workers’ indirect utility
functions used to evaluate the stability properties of the different potential outcomes. First of all,
from the first order conditions for the maximization of profits, we obtain the following equilibrium
price for varieties sold at home
p∗zz(λz, ρ) =
tdL
¡L
2 + ρλzH
¢
(1− λz)M + 2a
¡L
2 + λzH
¢
2 (2bL + dLM)
¡L
2 + ρλzH
¢ (15)
where z = r, s. The asterisk always denotes equilibrium values.
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